Abstract -An operational complexity model (OCM) is proposed to enable the complexity of both the cognitive and the computational components of a process to be determined. From the complexity of formation of a set of traces via a specified route a measure of the probability of that route can be determined. By determining the complexities of alternative routes leading to the formation of the same set of traces, the odds indicating the relative plausibility of the alternative routes can be found. An illustrative application to a BitTorrent piracy case is presented, and the results obtained suggest that the OCM is capable of providing a realistic estimate of the odds for two competing hypotheses. It is also demonstrated that the OCM can be straightforwardly refined to encompass a variety of circumstances.
Introduction and Background
The basis of an operational complexity model (OCM) has recently been given by Overill & Silomon [1] . The model is based on the general observation that an inverse relationship holds between the difficulty and/or intricacy involved in performing a task in a specified manner, as measured by its intrinsic complexity, and the likelihood that the task in question was in fact performed in the specified manner. In essence, the idea underpinning the model is that the more complex a process is, the less likely it is to occur.
Thus, in the context of a digital forensic examination, the operational complexity of formation of a set of digital evidential traces by a specified route should in principle be susceptible to 'bottom-up' ab initio determination. The resultant complexity should then be inversely related to the probability of formation by that route.
There are many definitions of complexity. Lloyd [2] gives several complexity measures that in principle permit the complexity of formation of a set of digital evidential traces {E i } to be defined. These metrics include computational complexity [3] , information based complexity [4] , logical depth [5] , thermodynamic depth (and dive) [6] and crypticity [7] . The data available in the problem space of digital forensic analysis appears to be most closely aligned with the computational complexity metric [3] since the remaining candidate metrics require additional information or knowledge that is not normally available during a digital forensic investigation. In addition, it is desirable to include in the model a component relating to the human (i.e. cognitive) complexity of the task. The GOMS (Goals, Operators, Methods, Selections) family of models offers a well-understood approach to the problem. In particular, the GOMS Keyboard-Level Model (KLM) [8] provides a tractable means of measuring the human involvement in the operational process.
The development of the OCM offers forensic examiners and expert witnesses the possibility of computing the probabilities that a given set of recovered digital evidential traces was formed via a number of alternative (mutually exclusive) routes, each corresponding to a different hypothesis (or narrative) about how the traces were formed. These hypotheses are understood to be in competition with one another and their relative plausibility will be an important factor in deciding whether a successful prosecution can be brought.
The Operational Complexity Model
The resulting model may be formalized as follows. The various feasible routes by which the recovered set of digital evidential traces could have been formed are first enumerated. For each feasible route k by which the set of digital evidential traces {E i } could have been formed the operational complexity of that route is given by:
where C k comprises a cognitive complexity component specified by the GOMS-KLM model [8] and a suitably defined computational complexity (CC) [3] component. The operational complexity C k of each feasible route k and its probability of occurrence p k are taken to be inversely related:
The constant of proportionality is determined uniquely by the normalization condition on the sum of the probabilities over all feasible routes k:
The constant of proportionality reflects the units in which the complexity of each of the feasible routes k is measured, and is given by:
It should be noted here that while the OCM model makes use of a complexity metric it is not based on Shannon information theory [9] , which would lead to an inverse exponential relation:
Bayesian statistics [10] (which deal with the probability of an event A given an event B) have been applied previously to generating plausible crime scenarios [11] . However, they have only recently been employed in a digital forensic analysis context [12] , where a Bayesian network model was used to study the problem of missing evidence.
The posterior probability of a feasible route k leading to the formation of a recovered set of digital evidential traces {E i } is given by Pr(H k |{E i }), where H k represents the hypothesis that feasible route k was taken. The posterior odds for two alternative routes k and k' leading to the formation of the same recovered set of digital evidential traces {Ei} is then given by:
Note that the odds are independent of the constant of proportionality since appears linearly in both the numerator and the denominator.
In a digital forensics context, if H k represents the prosecution's contention regarding the formation of {Ei} and H k' is the defence's alternative contention, then the odds O(k:k') provide a measure of the relative plausibility of the two competing hypotheses. More generally, if a total of n feasible routes are identified which are each capable of leading to the formation of the set of recovered traces, then the odds that feasible route k was taken are given by:
where H c k is the hypothesis that feasible route k was not taken, and involves summing the individual probabilities of the remaining n-1 feasible routes.
Application to the BitTorrent Case
To illustrate the use of the operational complexity model outlined above we give here an application to the BitTorrent case described previously [12] . The prosecution case is taken to be exactly as described in [12] , that is, the seized computer was used as the initial seeder to share the pirated file on a BitTorrent network; see also Figure 1 in the Appendix. The defence's alternative explanation for the presence of the recovered set of digital evidential traces {Ei} has been constructed as follows. A Trojan horse program carrying the multimedia file as part of its payload installed itself on the defendant's unprotected computer and invoked the μTorrent client to upload the multimedia file to a peerto-peer (P2P) file sharing website, before finally uninstalling itself.
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions for the purposes of this illustration. The computer was assumed to be running an MS Windows-like environment; the Trojan horse program is not equipped with its own life-support system; the computer is not protected by an operational firewall or anti-malware scanner. The basic unit of the GOMS-KLM characterization of cognitive information processing is taken to be the mouse button press or release; similarly, the basic unit of information processing used in characterizing the computational complexity is the byte. Disk accesses are assumed to take place autonomously and concurrently with CPU-and RAM-based processes. Given these assumptions and using documented typical or limiting values for all other quantities (see Tables 1-5 in the Appendix for full details) we obtain the following results: Hence, providing that route k' is the only feasible alternative to route k, we find O(k:k') 4.60, indicating that the prosecution's case is 4.6 times more plausible than the defence's case, given the recovered evidence. Alternatively, in the absence of any other feasible explanations, the probability that the prosecution's case is correct is 82%.
Refinement of the Model
It is possible to make straightforward refinements to the simple operational complexity model given in Section 2 above in a number of ways. For example, given the result obtained in Section 3 above for the BitTorrent case [12] with an unprotected computer, a forensic examiner or expert witness might wish to know how the computed odds would change if an up-to-date anti-malware scanner were in fact installed and operational on the computer. This can be determined by making use of published values for the success rates of Trojan horse interception by commercially available anti-malware scanners. Current average values quoted by commercial anti-malware providers are typically 98% [13] , although independent comparative surveys do not appear to be publicly available. As a consequence, the probability of the Trojan horse narrative is reduced from 18% to 0.36% in this scenario.
A further refinement that has been considered is the most appropriate relative weighting between the cognitive and computational components of the operational complexity metric. It can be persuasively argued that the cognitive component should be scaled by the ratio of the processing rates of the human and the computer, typically 10 7 . In that case, CC k = 9,396,975,482
and O(k:k') 2.10, decreasing the plausibility of the prosecution's case to 68%. Combining this result with the Trojan horse interception scenario yields a slightly increased probability of 0.64% for this narrative.
A further consideration is that of disk access. The model implicitly assumes that disk transfers are effectively 'hidden' by means of an autonomous concurrent process, such as that implemented by a DMA channel. An alternative approach would be to adopt a typical RAM-to-disk access times ratio for data transfers so that the DSK actions in the analysis (Tables 4 and 5 The most appropriate levels of granularity for different parts of the complexity metric are still under consideration. One possible option is to use a more coarse-grained metric for repetitive byte-wise operations, such as copying a large multimedia file, such that these operations are represented as single macros. An advantage of this approach would be that copying a 2N-byte file would not be considered to possess twice the operational complexity of copying an Nbyte file.
Summary and Conclusions
The recently developed operational complexity model enables the complexity of both the cognitive and the computational components of a process to be determined. From the complexity of formation of a set of traces via a specified route the probability of that route can be determined. By determining the complexities of alternative routes leading to the formation of the same set of traces, the odds indicating the relative plausibility of the alternative narratives of formation can be found. An illustrative application to the previously discussed BitTorrent case [12] has been presented, and the results obtained suggest that the proposed operational complexity model is capable of providing a realistic estimate of the odds for two competing hypotheses. It has also been demonstrated that the model is capable of straightforward refinement to encompass a variety of circumstances, such as relative rates of human vs. computer processing, RAM vs. disk access, and the presence of security measures. These features should provide valuable support for forensic examiners and expert witnesses seeking to assess the strength of a case given the recovered digital evidence.
H 5 The connection between the seized computer and the tracker server was maintained 
